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Abstract
We examine the phenomenon of escalation from an economist's perspective, emphasiz-
ing explanations which do not rule out rational behavior on the part of rms or agents. We
argue that escalation cannot be established as a separate phenomenon unless these pos-
sible alternative explanations are properly accounted for. We present Staw and Hoang's
(1995) study of NBA data as an instance of where evidence of escalation might be over-
turned upon more careful analysis. After performing several tests of our alternative
explanations, we nd that evidence of escalation persists, although it is weaker both in
duration and magnitude.
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Colin F. Camerer Roberto A. Weber
1 Introduction
\Escalation of commitment" occurs when people or organizations who have committed
resources to a project are inclined to "throw good money after bad" and maintain or
increase their commitment to the project, even when its marginal costs (MC) exceed
marginal benets (MB). The escalation phenomenon, which is very similar to the \sunk
cost fallacy", is familiar to social psychologists and organizational theorists and is taken
as well-established.
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Compared to some other behavioral phenomena which question the rationality of
rms and individuals, escalation has not captured the attention of economists. While
escalation appears to be an important and large source of organizational (and individual)
irrationality, economists have typically pointed to explanations that question the conclu-
sion that escalation is common and suboptimal. In this paper we reopen the debate about
suboptimal escalation in an eort to address concerns economists and econometricians
are likely to have.
Our paper has two separate parts{ one theoretical and one statistical. The theoretical
section consists of an \economists'-eye" view of the large literature on escalation. We
provide reasons why apparently irrational ongoing investments might actually be rational.

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Escalation of commitment and the sunk cost fallacy are essentially the same phenomenon: both lead
decision makers to exaggerate investments following previous commitment of resources. One distinction
is that escalation may be associated with forms of commitment other than previous expenditures of
economic resources, or sunk costs. For instance, it is possible for a decision maker to escalate following a
verbal commitment. This implies that escalation is a more general phenomenon which includes escalating
commitment to sunk costs.
We also argue that when escalation is irrational for rms, it is often explained by more
basic forces which are familiar to behavioral economists (mutually-destructive rivalry,
optimistic judgment biases, and agency costs).
Our statistical contribution is a closer look at existing eld evidence of escalation.
There are only four non-experimental multiple-observation eld studies showing evidence
of suboptimal escalation. One study shows that the tendency of banks to write o bad
loans is correlated with managerial turnover(Staw, Barsade and Koput, 1997). Another
study shows that employees' performance evaluations by supervisors were aected by
whether the supervisors had hired the employees originally or not (Schoorman, 1988). A
third study found that entrepreneurs who started their own businesses invested more than
those who bought businesses from others (McCarthy, Schoorman and Cooper, 1993).
These three studies are consistent with economic explanations which suppose that
people are rational but have dierent opinions (prior beliefs) about the quality of loans,
prospective employees, and businesses. The ndings in all three studies can be explained
by prior beliefs which are not updated suÆciently quickly to converge to a common
posterior belief. The studies are consistent with escalation as well, but they do not
provide conclusive evidence because the diering-belief explanation has not been ruled
out.
Our statistical analysis replicates and extends a fourth eld study conducted by Staw
and Hoang (1995), which demonstrates that NBA basketball players who were high-
ranking draft picks played more minutes than was justied by their subsequent perfor-
mance. Staw and Hoang interpret this result as evidence that teams escalated their
commitment to high-ranking players, but their analysis does not entirely rule out some
alternative rational explanations. We collected a new sample of data on NBA players
and replicated their results. We then reexamined the data using variables and methods
which could rule out alternative explanations. The results show a signicant, temporary
escalation eect which is about half as strong in magnitude and statistical strength as
the original eect reported by Staw and Hoang, supporting their basic conclusion. Our
results rule out rational alternative explanations more eectively than earlier studies did,
and hence constitute the most conclusive available eld evidence of irrational escalation.
2 Escalation in the NBA: A reexamination
Staw and Hoang tested whether players chosen earlier in the National Basketball Asso-
ciation (NBA) draft receive more playing time after controlling for dierences in perfor-
mance. The NBA draft is the annual process whereby players entering the professional
league are allocated to teams. The draft consists of several rounds in each of which a
team initially has one selection.
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The use of a team's draft allocation on a particular
player therefore reects a commitment of resources to obtaining that player's talent {
2
This can change, however, if teams make trades or deals with other teams for additional selections
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the sooner a player is drafted, the more of a commitment it represents, both in terms of
opportunity cost (foregone players) and nancial resources (the NBA salary structure is
such that rookie players' salaries are closely tied to their position in the draft).
As Staw and Hoang point out, however, draft order is not a perfect predictor of
performance. It is often the case that players drafted early in the rst round end up
performing poorly and having short careers while players drafted later can turn out to
be all-stars. Therefore, it is often the case that a team's initial evaluation of the value
of a drafted player turns out to be wrong. The fact that resources have already been
committed to such a player leads to a situation where escalation might arise: rather
than decrease the player's court time based on poor performance, a team may over-use
a player relative to his value if a large previous commitment has been made.
Staw and Hoang test the hypotheses that a lower draft number leads to more playing
time, higher longevity in the league, and a lower likelihood of being traded. Draft order
has a signicant eect on all three dependent variables. They conclude that this is
evidence of escalation of commitment in personnel decisions in the NBA.
The theoretical section below describes some of the conditions under which suboptimal
escalation seems to occur. The ndings of Staw and Hoang are surprising because they
do not seem to t these conditions. Escalation only occurs when there is ambiguity
about future costs and benets of an investment (like making loans, hiring employees, or
drilling for oil); but there is less ambiguity about costs and benets of an NBA draft pick
because a player's salary is negotiated in advance and performance is easily measured
and observed every night. Therefore, it seems that there is less room for optimistic or
self-serving biases in judging costs and benets which could cause escalation. Another
condition for suboptimal escalation is an agency problem, in which managers continue
investments which are bad for the rm because quitting would reveal their mistake. But
NBA team management is usually very lean{ draft choices are made by a general manager
who consults closely with the team owner{ so there is little room for an agency problem.
Mutually-destructive rivalry is another condition for suboptimal escalation, but does not
apply because teams don't play a mediocre draft choice to get back at other teams who
are doing the same. Still another element of escalation is that marginal investments oer
some hope of `breaking even' or recouping the original investment. But teams spend
draft picks and money initially, then make marginal investments in terms of playing time
(minutes). They cannot directly recoup the sunk resource by spending further resources,
because the resources are in dierent `currencies' (draft picks and playing times). Taken
together, the absence of the conditions under which suboptimal escalation appears to
occur leads one to wonder why escalation occurs for NBA draft picks.
Staw and Hoang also acknowledge several rational explanations for escalation, but
do not clearly rule them out. This leads to an important methodological question: How
carefully must one rule out alternative explanations (even ones that seem implausible or
are particularly diÆcult to test) before accepting the conclusion that irrational escalation
occurred? Behavioral economists have learned that it is easier to win the hearts and minds
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of economists with data that clearly rule out an alternative hypothesis than with mere
reason and argument. We apply this principle to Staw and Hoang's study and include
some additional variables and methods to rule out alternative rational explanations.
Among the possible alternative explanations are:
1. Backup player `costs'. An explanation not considered by Staw and Hoang (men-
tioned to us by Chip Heath) is due to the nature of the draft itself. The draft is
designed to give teams with worse records better chances of obtaining good players.
Until recently, initial draft order was directly determined by a team's prior season
win-loss record.
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Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that teams which obtain
the players with the lowest draft numbers tend to be teams which have less talent.
Given that an important determinant of playing time is the expected performance
of the next available player, players at worse teams, and therefore with lower draft
numbers, might naturally be played more minutes than players taken later in the
draft but at teams with more talent. Staw and Hoang include a measure of the
team's overall performance in their analysis, but a player-specic measure of the
strength of the next-best player at their position is a better control. Including a
measure of a team's strength at a given player's position controls for the marginal
costs of not playing a draft choice, and might explain part of the draft-order eect.
2. Pre-draft expectations. An alternative which Staw and Hoang explore more care-
fully is the idea that draft order is an indication of the expected future performance
or skill level of a given player. The same player's performance during a season is
then another signal of inherent quality. Teams could be gradually updating their
beliefs about the player's true ability, but if they begin with higher expectations for
more highly-drafted players, then they should play those players more frequently
until they become convinced that their initial expectations were too optimistic. It
is hard to know whether this updating should take place over one year or ve years,
or ten. Draft order could also capture elements of player quality not encompassed
by court statistics. Staw and Hoang recognize this possibility and measure the
eect of draft order on performance by regressing a composite measure of perfor-
mance on draft number and on player performance, position, trades and injuries
in the prior year (the results of this are discussed but not presented in the paper).
They nd that draft order is a signicant predictor of performance \surprise" in
the second and third years, but not in the fourth and fth years. They conclude
that \while draft order does appear to contain some useful information on players'
early performance, it is not a signicant predictor over longer periods of time" (p.
488).
The fact that draft order captures an element of performance not included in the
previous year's data for (possibly) the rst three years is important enough to war-
rant further analysis. We try to capture information about expected performance
3
Now the order is determined probabilistically, but teams with worse records have a higher chance of
obtaining early draws.
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in two ways. First, we include a measure of pre-draft player rankings by an out-
side expert. Second, we use a two-stage procedure in which performance is rst
predicted by lagged performance and draft choice (controlling for any predictive
power of draft order), then expected performance is included in the playing-time
regression. This procedure separates the informational component of draft order
from the pure escalation eect.
3. Fan appeal. Highly drafted players may be especially popular with fans. If teams
allocate playing time to maximize revenue, and fan popularity leads to increased
revenue, it might be optimal to play highly-drafted players often to draw more
ticket buyers to the games, even if the players are not performing well.
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Staw and
Hoang note the possible eect but conclude that \the biggest problem with this
alternative is that fan appeal is ephemeral. Though popularity among fans may be
based on a player's college reputation for the rst year or two he is in the NBA,
it is likely that popularity erodes quickly if it is not backed up by performance at
the professional level." (p 488). While this is probably true, it is still worthwhile
to evaluate the possible impact of fan appeal on playing time rather than simply
dismissing it.
4. Deescalating escalation: Draft x trade interaction. If escalation arises out of the
draft as a commitment of resources, then when a player is traded to a new team,
the new team should not inherit the escalation motives of the rst team.
5
So we
can ask: When a player is traded to a new team, does the eect of draft number
disappear? If so, then it is still possibly the case that escalation is present (since the
second team should have no reason to commit resources based on the draft order). If
not, however, then it is maybe evidence that draft order has a predictive value above
prior statistics and that the new team recognizes and uses this information much
as the rst team. Notice that this test uses a prediction about when deescalation
will occur as evidence that escalation occurs (cf. Heath, 1995).
5. First vs. second-round contract dierences. There may be important economic dif-
ferences between rst and second round draftees. This is important because Staw
and Hoang measured draft order by simply treating the rst player in the sec-
ond round as one position behind the last player in the rst round. If there is a
fundamental dierence in rst and second round costs or benets, this should be
controlled for by including a dummy variable for round.
Now (in 1997) it is typical for rst-round draftees to get guaranteed \pay or play"
contracts, which guarantee the players their salaries even if they are cut from the
4
Some collateral evidence on this point comes from racial preferences. It is widely thought that in
cities with larger white populations, teams keep white players, and perhaps play them more frequently
than their performance warrants, because fans want them to. Nardinelli and Simon (1990) report
evidence from baseball card prices which indicates that a player's race (in addition to performance)
aects the price of his card. This evidence suggests how it is possible that teams would not strictly
maximize team performance and suggests a possible method for measuring fan appeal.
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One can argue that a trade represents a commitment which can also be escalated by excessive playing
time, but it cannot be true that drafting players and trading for others both generate commitments which
raise all players' playing time.
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team. Second round players usually do not have such contracts. This dierence
implies that rst round players are \cheaper" because they must be paid even if
another player is playing in their place. As result, teams have an economic incentive,
ceteris paribus, to play rst round players rather than second round players.
We are not certain when rst-round guaranteed contracts became common (our
sports-trivia sources think it might be around 1990). But if such contracts were
common during much of our sample (and Staw and Hoang's), this pay-or-play
eect could be proxied for by draft order, producing a spurious nding of apparent
escalation. To control for this possibility, we include a rst-round dummy variable.
6. Use of aggregated lagged performance factors. To control for past performance, Staw
and Hoang use lagged performance variables aggregated into three separate factors.
There are two possible problems with this procedure. First, prior season statistics
may not accurately capture a player's performance on the court in a given season.
This is important because it is current performance which should determine the
amount of time a player spends on the court. Second, aggregation increases noise
in these variables as measures of performance. If draft order contains information
which predicts performance, the introduction of noise in measurement of perfor-
mance means that any informational eect of draft order is picked up by the draft
order coeÆcient in a regression on playing time, which inates the coeÆcient on
draft order, exaggerating the apparent escalation eect. We control for this prob-
lem by using ten separate performance variables, rather than aggregating them to
three measures.
Our approach is to rst replicate Staw and Hoang's results as closely as possible,
to see if we can replicate the eect of the draft-order variable which is consistent with
escalation. Then we add control measures to see if draft order still predicts minutes
when controlling for the above alternative explanations. We predicted that the draft
order eect would disappear.
3 A Reexamination of Escalation in the Field: Anal-
ysis of Playing Time
Staw and Hoang's sample includes all of the players taken in the rst two rounds of the
1980-1986 NBA drafts. Our sample is similarly restricted to the rst two rounds, but
encompasses players selected in the 1986-1991 drafts. There are two reasons why we
modied the years included in the analysis. First, we hoped to obtain data which would
provide a measure of fan appeal for reasons given above. After considering endorsement
contracts (for which data is unavailable) we decided upon pricing of player trading cards,
which captures the extent to which a given player's card is desired by fans and is usually
accepted as a good measure of fan appeal. However, there is very little variance in card
prices after 1990{ only the cards of a few superstars exhibit any dierence from the base
price{ and data were not available for some of the players in the sample. We also tried
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to obtain records of the number of fans who voted for each player to be on the All-Star
team, but could not obtain such data.
6
.
Second, we wanted a ranking of expected player quality not directly related to draft
order or expected order. A natural source proved to be pre-draft scouting reports. One
such annual report is produced by NBA Analyst Don Leventhal. However, his reports
are only available starting in 1985. Given that our goal is to rst replicate Staw and
Hoang's results, the use of dierent time periods should not be a problem if we can rst
establish their basic nding using data from a new time period.
Similarly to Staw and Hoang, we included in our sample only those players who were
signed and played at least two years in the NBA. The reason for the two year minimum
is that it is necessary to obtain prior performance data for the analysis and this data
obviously only exists at the pre-professional level for all rookies. Therefore, while it would
be benecial to be able to conduct an analysis of rst year playing time (particularly since
this is when the draft order eect may be strongest under the draft-as-signal hypothesis),
obtaining performance measures proves diÆcult.
Our sample, then, included a total of 229 players. To replicate Staw and Hoang's
results, we obtained several season statistics for each player in our sample. Player statis-
tics are carefully recorded during each game and are easily available from several sources.
Our sources were primarily the following two books: The OÆcial NBA Basketball Ency-
clopedia (Ed. A. Sachare, 1994) and The Sports Encyclopedia: Pro Basketball (Neft and
Cohen, 1991). We also obtained information directly from the NBA through their web-
site. As a replication of Staw and Hoang's main study, we used as our dependent variable
the number of minutes each player was on the court during a season. In order to measure
performance, we again used the same technique and obtained nine player statistics from
the above sources. The following statistics were obtained for each player/season in our
sample: total number of points scored, assists, steals, shots blocked, rebounds, personal
fouls, free-throw percentage, eld-goal percentage, and 3-point eld-goal percentage. In
addition, we controlled for the eect of playing time on total points, assists, steals, fouls,
shots blocked and rebounds by dividing these measures by total minutes played.
In order to directly replicate Staw and Hoang's analysis, we conducted a factor anal-
ysis of the nine performance variables to determine broader performance measures, as
they did. Using the same approach as Staw and Hoang, we divided players into two
categories, guards and forwards/centers, and conducted separate principal components
factor analyses with varimax rotation on each category. This procedure yielded results
similar to Staw and Hoang's: the same three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0
surfaced for both samples. Together, these three factors explained 55 percent of the vari-
ance in the correlation matrix for forwards and centers and 57 percent for guards.
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Using
the same structure as Staw and Hoang for labelling the components, we constructed
the following three performance variables: 1) scoring (points per minute, eld-goal per-
6
The vote counts are not released by the NBA, apparently at the insistence of the players' union
7
The three factors used by Staw and Hoang explained 58 percent of the variance for both samples.
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centage, and free-throw percentage), 2) toughness (rebounds per minute, blocked shots
per minute, and personal fouls per minute), and 3) quickness (assists per minute and
steals per minute).
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Finally, we followed Staw and Hoang's procedure and standardized
the three measures so that all three variables had a mean of 0 and variance equal to 1,
standardizing separately for guards and forwards.
In addition to the above performance measures, we included several other variables
also present in Staw and Hoang's study. First, in order to capture any eects of a
player being traded, we included a variable trade which equaled 1 if a player was traded
during or before a particular season and equaled 0 otherwise. Another variable, win
was included to capture a team's overall talent and consisted of the percentage of wins
over the entire season. A dummy variable (forward/center) to capture any dierences
between forward/centers (1) and guards (0) was also included in the estimation. Finally,
since injuries can obviously have an eect on playing time, a binary variable injury was
included which was equal to 1 if a player was injured during a particular season and 0
otherwise.
The results obtained by Staw and Hoang are reported in Table 1 and the results of
our replication are reported in Table 2. The model in both cases consists of regressing
minutes in year t on performance in year t  1, the above four control variables for year
t, and on the player's rank when drafted (draft number). Our results closely match
those obtained by Staw and Hoang. There is no signicant dierence in either sample
between players in the forward/center position and those in the guard position. Similarly,
the variables win and toughness have no signicant eect on playing time (in Staw and
Hoang's sample these variables are never signicant at reasonable levels, and in our
sample win is signicant at p < 0:05 only in Year 2). In both samples, prior year scoring
appears to be the performance measure which best predicts playing time. Injuries and
trades also seem to have a consistently signicant negative eect.
Draft order is a signicant predictor or playing time in both samples. Our results
indicated that a minimal increment in draft order decreased playing time from 22 minutes
in year 2 to 11 minutes in year 5. These estimates are quite close to their estimates (23
to 14 minutes). In both samples, draft order is a signicant predictor of playing time
through the fth year, and the eect shrinks over time.
In order to control for alternative explanations of the draft-order eect, we re-estimated
the model with several new variables. The rst set of additional variables were perfor-
mance measures for the substitutes available for a team at the player's position. That
is, in order to measure the opportunity cost to a team of playing a particular player
additional minutes, we obtained statistics for the (composite) back-up players in that
position.
9
The correlation between minutes played by drafted players in the sample and
by their back-up players is -.51, which shows that drafted players and the composite
8
These factors correspond to those used by Staw and Hoang with the exception that we included
personal fouls in the toughness variable since this was consistent with the results of the component
analysis for both samples.
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The back-up `player' was actually a composite of all the likely players who would be on the court if
8
back-up are indeed substitutes. For each back-up, we collected data on the same ten
performance variables as we did for each player in our sample. This data was used in the
factor analysis described above, to construct the same three performance indices as we
did for the other players. These indices are labelled back-up scoring, back-up toughness,
and back-up quickness.
Among the alternative explanations outlined above is the idea that draft order cap-
tures beliefs about a player's skill which are updated but not perfectly determined by
subsequent playing statistics. In order to test this hypothesis, we included a variable
called belief to capture beliefs about player quality at the time of the draft. We use
Don Leventhal's annual ranking of players available for the draft. Each year Leventhal, a
draft analyst for the sports network ESPN, compiles a ranking of the top 180-200 players
entering the draft. It is important to note that this ranking is intended to list players
by quality and not by expected draft order. As Leventhal himself puts it, \The above
list is not so much a prediction of the order of selection in the rst-round, but rather a
combination of my own and the NBA scouts' rankings of the top players . . . " (Leventhal,
1986 p. 6). In fact, in a separate section of the draft report, he includes a prediction of
the order of the draft - taking into account teams' needs and other factors. This ranking
includes all eligible players entering the draft and we include their rank number as a
variable.
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Since we might expect a high degree of collinearity between belief and draft,
we tested the correlation between the two variables and found it to be .67. While this
does indicate that there is some collinearity, our hypothesis that the eect of draft will be
reduced with the introduction of belief is still testable by estimating the marginal eect
of belief on the predictive ability of draft.
In addition, in order to test the eect of trades on the escalation phenomenon (as we
discussed above) we included a draft x trade interaction variable. Finally, we included
a dummy variable, rst round, which was set to 1 if the player was selected in the rst
round of the draft, and 0 otherwise.
the draftee was not playing, weighted by their (season total) minutes. If the player in our sample was
a center, our variable included the two other centers with the most minutes. This procedure captures
the fact that since there is only one center on the court at a given time, all the centers on the team are
possible back-ups. If the player was a guard or forward, we rst eliminated the player in that position
with the most minutes, and then included the next three players in the same position with the most
minutes. This procedure is appropriate because there are usually two guards and forwards on the court
at a time; a guard or forward's back-ups should include only the remaining players after excluding
the player with the most minutes (who is likely to be on the court). For draftees who are listed as
playing two positions, or who play for more than one team during a season, we constructed a composite
consisting of a simple average of backups for the two positions or their various teams. This procedure
is very labor-intensive because it requires gathering information on at least three times as many players
as there are draftees.
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For the rst two years of our sample separate rankings are given for seniors and for underclassmen
not among the top 24 players entering the draft. However, because almost all underclassmen entering
the draft were among the top 24, we used the ranking of the top 24 along with the ranking of the top
seniors to construct a ranking for all the players. There was only one non-senior who did not appear in
the ranking of the top 24, and this player was given the highest possible ranking he could have received
given that he was not on the list.
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Table 3 presents the results of the regression including the additional control variables.
Scoring and quickness are again the only two performance measures which are signicant
predictors of playing time. The coeÆcient on trade is again signicant, but now only
for years 2 and 3. However, the diminished eect of trade is not surprising given the
introduction of the draft x trade interaction term.
Including the additional variables increases the adjusted-R
2
slightly, but Back-up
scoring is the only additional control variable which is ever signicant at reasonable
levels. It is surprising that the coeÆcient on rst round has the opposite sign from what
we predicted for all four years.
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The introduction of the control variables does not dampen the eect of draft order.
However, the signicance of the coeÆcient for the draft variable decreases more quickly
across the years in our sample (for example, the coeÆcient has a t-statistic of -.67 in year
5).
In order to address the previously mentioned concerns about the use of lagged per-
formance factors, we then re-estimated the model using contemporaneous performance
variables. The dependent variable was again minutes in a season. As independent vari-
ables, however, we used all nine performance statistics for the same season, both for
players and for back-ups. Because the number of times a player turns the ball over to the
opposing team is an important measure of productivity which Staw and Hoang omitted,
we included one additional performance variable: turnovers per minute, both for players
in our sample and for their back-ups. In addition to draft order, we again included the
control variables injury, trade, win, belief, rst round, and draft x trade. Finally, since
it was no longer necessary to use data from prior years, we conducted the estimation for
all of the rst ve years of the players in our sample.
For this estimation, we restricted our sample in a given year to players for which we
had data on all prior years. That is, we omitted any players with prior gaps in their
playing careers.
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Table 4 contains the results for all ve years. Notice that the corrected R-squared
values are considerably higher in Table 4 than they are in Table 3 for all years in which the
data overlap, indicating that current performance is a better predictor of current minutes
than lagged performance (as expected). Among the performance variables, personal
fouls per minute appears to be the strongest predictor of playing time. This is not
surprising since it is usually the case that players are taken o the court once they
11
The estimate indicates that rst round players actually receive less playing time than those selected
in the second round. While our hypothesis called for a one-tailed test and, therefore, the coeÆcient is
never signicantly dierent from zero in the direction we predicted, it would only be signicant in one
out of the four years in a two-tailed test.
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This was done in order to enable us to make comparisons between the results of these regressions and
those of future regressions where performance data on all prior years is necessary. We also conducted
the same analysis using all of the players in our sample who played in the given year and found that our
results were not altered signicantly.
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accumulate personal fouls in order to prevent them from exceeding the foul limit and
being disqualied from further play. Finally, eld goal percentage, points per minute and
assists per minute also appear to have an eect on playing time, although none of these
is signicant throughout all ve years.
As earlier results indicated, the eect of draft order on minutes played is strong in
the rst three years of a player's career. For these years, a minimal decrease in draft
number predicts an increase of up to 29 minutes in playing time. The magnitude of the
coeÆcient is always greater than 25 and the coeÆcient is signicantly dierent from zero
at the p < 0:001 level in all three years. However, the eect of draft order in years 4 and
5 is dramatically reduced and insignicant.
While it is possible to interpret the decrease in the importance of draft order as a
player's tenure in the NBA increases as a diminishing eect of escalation, the decrease is
also consistent with the idea that the draft captures prior information about the quality
of players which is subsequently discounted. Given that these priors are subjective in-
terpretations by teams, it is diÆcult to accurately measure them or estimate their eect.
If these priors are overly optimistic, then it is possible that the observed \escalation" is
simply a manifestation of this bias in judgment. However, even if the priors are unbiased,
and represent accurate measures of overall quality, then it is possible that the rational
use of prior beliefs is evident in the predictive ability of draft order.
One possible method for evaluating the existence of the rational use of unbiased
priors is to determine the eect of draft order on performance, after controlling for prior
performance.
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If information present in the draft is an unbiased predictor of future
performance and accurately serves as a measure of a player's overall quality, then the
marginal eect of draft order on performance should capture such information not picked
up by prior statistics. This provides us with a possible test of the draft order as escalation
vs. information hypothesis. If draft order merely captures unbiased prior beliefs, then
the eect of draft order on performance (after controlling for prior performance) should
be similar in duration to the eect of draft order on playing time. However, if escalation
is present, then the eect of draft order on minutes played should persist beyond the
predictive value of draft order on performance.
In order to conduct this test, we regressed performance in year t on performance
in prior years as well on draft order. We conducted separate regressions for Years 2
through 5. In order to aggregate the several performance variables we had for each player,
we constructed an index, performance, by averaging the three performance variables:
scoring, toughness, and quickness. This variable was then regressed on each of the three
performance factors for all prior years and on draft order. In addition, we included the
variable for injuries, since it is possible that a player's performance may be lower if he is
injured. The results are presented in Table 5.
The results indicate that draft order does have some signicant power for predicting
13
This is the method used by Staw and Hoang, but they reported no details.
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performance (at p < :05), through the fourth year. Table 6 summarizes the eects of
draft order in Tables 4-5, comparing the eect of draft order on playing time (minutes)
and on performance. Staw and Hoang used this comparison to argue for escalation
because the eect of draft order on performance became insignicant in years 4 and 5,
while the eect on minutes was signicant in all years. Our results are opposite. The
draft order coeÆcient in the minutes regression is highly signicant in years 2 and 3,
but becomes insignicant in the fourth year, while the eect on performance is still
marginally signicant in the fourth year. This pattern suggests that the escalation eect
of draft order on playing time `wears o' before the information content of draft order
for predicting performance does.
This nding goes against the escalation hypothesis. If the analysis were to stop at
this point, one could conclude that there is no evidence of an irrational escalation eect.
However, the eect of draft order on playing time is statistically stronger in years 1-2 than
the eect on predicting performance (measured by t-statistics). This fact suggests that
there might be an informational eect and an escalation eect in the rst two years. The
analyses summarized in Table 6 simply do not tell us whether there is a pure escalation
eect of draft order on minutes, above that which can be explained by the information
value of draft order, in years 1 and 2. There might be irrational escalation, but we simply
cannot tell.
Fortunately, there is a simple two-stage procedure for separating the two eects in
each year. First, we perform the following regression for each of the ten performance
variables j and for each year T :
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The tted portion of this regression,
^
P
jT
, represents the expected performance in year T
given prior performance and all the exogenous variables, including draft order. Hence,
this measure contains any information present in draft number which may be relevant to
the expected current output of a player in a given performance category.
We then used these expected performance measures in place of actual performance
statistics in the minutes played regression:
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If draft order contains information about performance, but does not inuence playing
time after that information content is controlled for { i.e., there is no irrational escalation
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eect { then the coeÆcient on draft order should be insignicant in the second-stage
playing-time regression.
Table 7 shows the results of the second-stage regression.
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This regression keeps a
constant sample of players and includes the expected performance measures (derived
from the ten rst-stage regressions of performance against lagged performance and all
the other exogenous variables, including draft order). The eect of draft number is about
half as large in magnitude as in the earlier results (e.g., Tables 2-3), declining from 14
minutes per increment to 2 minutes over years 2-5. The eect is also signicant in years
2-3, at p < :01, and insignicant after that.
To recap our results: The new sample replicates Staw and Hoang's nding of irrational
escalation in NBA playing time using their methods (Table 2). The nding holds up when
additional control variables are included (Table 3) and contemporaneous performance
is used instead of lagged performance (Table 4). While a direct regression of lagged
performance and draft order on performance shows that draft order does have some
forecasting power for predicting future performance (Table 5), a simple comparison of the
playing time and performance regressions cannot distinguish the (rational) information
eect from the escalation eect (Table 6). However, a two-stage procedure disentangles
the two (Table 7), and shows that when the information contained in draft order is
controlled for, an apparent escalation eect persists in the second and third years.
The methodological moral of the story is that including more controls and using the
two-stage procedure supports Staw and Hoang's conclusion, establishing more rmly that
there is an irrational escalation eect in eld data. At the same time, the controls and
procedure show that earlier results exaggerated the size and persistence of the eect by
roughly a factor of two. The exact source of the eect is unclear from these analyses.
15
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In the previous results (Table 4), the control variables for Belief, First round, and Draft*Trade were
generally insignicant or did not help explain the apparent escalation eect. Therefore, we exclude these
variables from the two-stage regression. In addition, to control for sample composition eects, we only
included players who appear continuously in the sample for ve years.
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The two-stage procedure essentially assumes that teams have rational expectations about the infor-
mation contained in draft order for predicting performance (in the standard sense, that subjective beliefs
match objective beliefs conditioned on available information). The results are still consistent with the
hypothesis that teams are sluggishly rational, in the sense that they have prior beliefs but update them
more slowly in the face of performance evidence than Bayesian updating assumes. The results are also
consistent with the hypothesis that teams have optimistic priors (e.g., each team thinks its draft choice
will perform better than average). A further possibility is that teams who are most optimistic about a
player, and therefore have the strongest positive beliefs, are more likely to select that player in the draft
and then overplay him until they gather enough information about his true ability. This argument is
similar to the principle referred to as the winner's curse, whereby the most optimistic bidder who highly
overvalues an item is the most likely to win the item in an auction, and does not anticipate this selection
bias when deciding how much to bid.
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4 The behavioral economics of escalation
An economist looking at the escalation literature immediately wonders whether escalation
is clearly established: Are all marginal costs and marginal benets accounted for? If so,
then one can proceed to ask whether causes of suboptimal escalation can be organized
into categories which are familiar in behavioral economics. This section attempts to do
so.
While previous sections have dealt specically with a re-examination of the evidence
of escalation in the NBA, the scope of this section is more general. Here we attempt
to examine the escalation phenomenon more broadly and point to more general reasons
why the phenomenon may not be as rmly established as is often believed. While not all
of the categories are directly relevant to the NBA case, we draw a link where possible.
4.1 Is E(MC) > E(MB)?
We denote the \true" expectations of MC and MB, using all publicly available infor-
mation, by E(MC) and E(MB). The rst step to establishing suboptimal escalation is
to check whether E(MC) is indeed greater than E(MB). If not, then by investing more
a rm is not escalating suboptimally. Three observations should be made at this point.
One is well-established in the escalation literature but bears repeating. The other two
seem more novel and might not occur to non-economists.
1. First, accounting forMC andMB carefully and choosing optimally will sometimes
produce decisions which will be suboptimal, after the fact, and which might look like
escalation to an untrained eye. For example, the lm \The Titanic" had an initial budget
of $150 million and was expected to gross, say $200 million. Notationally, express this
initial situation as E
0
(MC) = 150, E
0
(MB) = 200. Now partway through, the studio
has actually spent $200 million and thinks it will cost $85 million to nish. Assuming a
half-lmed movie is worthless, should the studio \escalate"? The answer is \Yes". The
marginal costs are E
1
(MC) = 85 and, if revenue expectations have not changed, the
marginal benets are E
1
(MB) = 200. Of course, if the revised estimates are accurate
the rm will end up spending a total of $285 million to earn $200 million, losing money.
But the blame should be pinned on optimistic initial cost forecasts, not on suboptimal
escalation. This example reminds us that bad outcomes are not always evidence of
suboptimal escalation.
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2. Inferring benets from sunk costs: In some examples it is natural to assume that
information about MC also aects estimates of MB. In these cases, when information
arises which raises MC, and seemingly makes E(MC) > E(MB), marginal benets
might sensibly rise too, which would justify escalation. For example, in the clever Arkes
16
Indeed, the large literature on \hindsight bias" suggests that when bad outcomes do occur, the
path which led predictably to those outcomes is psychologically available and leads to a tendency to
overestimate how easy it should have been to avoid disaster.
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and Blumer (1985) study, some students who approached a box oÆce to buy tickets for
a theater series were randomly given discounted tickets. They found that the students
who got discounted tickets came to the theater less often (for the rst half of the shows)
than those who paid full-price. A picky critique of this study is that students who got
discounts might have inferred something about the quality of the production from the
fact that they got a discount (i.e., perceived MB of attending is aected by MC).
17
Similarly, many of the most compelling examples of escalation come from studies in
which subjects are presented with vignettes describing an investment project. One group
of subjects are told that a large amount has already been invested and another group are
told that a small amount has been invested. Often the large-amount subjects choose to
invest more. Interpreting their behavior as suboptimal escalation is problematic unless
one is very condent that all else is held equal (in the minds of the subjects) in the
two cases. It may be natural for subjects to assume that rms or individuals investing
a large amount are more optimistic and perceive higher marginal benets, and hence
should invest more. Notice that experimentally, it is hard to rule this possibility out in a
between-subjects design: You can tell subjects to \assume nothing more than what you
are told" but this is no guarantee that they will not make some inference about expected
MB from previous investment. A better control is to conduct this experiment within-
subjects, asking the same subject whether the large- and small-amount rms should
invest more, and carefully instructing them to draw no inference about expected benets
from previous investment. Within-subject control seems better-suited to guaranteeing
that subjects do not infer anything about benets from past costs. To our knowledge,
this precise experiment has not been done.
3. Information benets of escalation: A proper accounting forMB should include the
value of any information which is (only) gathered by investing further. Since information
value is never negative, omitting this consideration always biases E(MB) downward and
makes suboptimal escalation appear more likely than it is. For all-or-nothing projects,
the information value of escalating might easily justify continuing to invest, even when
E(MC) > E(MB). Consider a rm that is undertaking some modest investment which,
if successful, will be repeated over and over (e.g., a restaurant franchise renovating the
dining room in one of its restaurants). Suppose the renovation cost escalates, so that
the cost of nishing one renovation, MC, is higher than the expected benet for that
restaurant. Then it may still pay to nish. The eventual benet MB may turn out
to be so low that, having experimented, the rm realizes it should not make the same
investment at all its outlets. On the other hand, if the eventual benet MB turns out
to be high it can be realized at outlet after outlet. Since the information gained about
whether to invest again is very valuable, it could be still worthwhile to escalate even
when the current-project MC are much larger than MB.
In the case of NBA draft picks, it is possible that higher draft picks receive more
17
A fussy control for this possibility is to tell all students that some students were awarded discounts,
so that even students who paid full price would also have any information about production quality
which is conveyed by the fact that discounts were available.
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playing time because teams are trying to determine the true value of their investment.
Since teams have only limited information about important factors such as a rookie
player's true NBA prospects or the ability of the player to t into the team's system,
then they might be playing their early draft picks more minutes to gather information.
While this would explain why the data reveal excess minutes given to early draft picks
during their rst season or two, it is unlikely that this eect would persist into later
years.
4.2 Behavioral economics causes of suboptimal escalation
Assume E(MC) > E(MB) and rms escalate anyway. What explanations might be
oered for escalation? We organize them into four categories which are familiar in be-
havioral economics. Some of these are familiar in the organizational literature but others
are not.
1. Gambling in the domain of losses. Many researchers have pointed out (e.g., Baz-
erman, 1984) that escalating commitment is utility-maximizing if people have a
convex disutility function for losses, so that they prefer to gamble in the domain
of losses in order to \break even" (as in prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). Formally, denote sunk costs by C
0
. Then this argument can be expressed
formally by the condition u(C
0
) < u(MB   MC   C
0
).
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Furthermore, Heath
(1995) argues persuasively that escalation is often inhibited if marginal costs are
paid in a dierent \currency" than sunk costs were paid in. Then MC and C
0
may not be naturally added together on a single scale and the escalation condition
u(C
0
) < u(MB  MC   C
0
) need not hold.
In corporate decisions, the importance of mental accounting implies that how deci-
sions are combined organizationally may moderate escalation in important ways (as
discussed by Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). Consider biotech rms that undertake
many R&D projects at a small scale, but produce very few marketable products.
How do these rms avoid escalating their modest investments after initial failures
(which are typical)? The answer is probably that divisional managers take a port-
folio view of dierent projects, which makes it easier to \write o" sunk costs from
any one project.
Heath (1995) makes the profound point that regarding escalation as a byproduct
of gambling over losses, under suitable mental accounting conditions, implies that
under predictable conditions rms will fail to escalate when they should (i.e., they
suboptimally deescalate). He shows that when total costs will exceed a natural
budget point, subjects often fail to invest further even though they should. In our
view, this important study sharply points out that escalation, per se, is not a useful
18
This argument depends on how costs and benets are \mentally accounted" for. The condition
above assumes that the person's reference point for accounting for costs and benets is set at zero (or
the pre-sunk cost level). If subjects \reset" their reference point after costs are sunk, then the correct
comparison is u(0) versus u(MB MC), and suboptimal escalation cannot be easily explained this way.
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category of phenomena. Instead, escalation is a byproduct of basic forces which
are present in individual decisions, may sometimes be optimal, and may sometimes
lead to the opposite of escalation.
2. Agency costs. In many organizational situations, E(MC) > E(MB) for the rm
but the private values to a decision-making agent favor escalation, denoted 
agent
(MC) < 
agent
(MB). This argument has been made several times with various
degrees of formality (Kanodia, Bushman, and Dickhaut, 1989; Prendergast and
Stole, 1996). The basic theme is that escalation which is suboptimal for the rm,
but privately rational for the agent, is just one example of how agents may take
actions which are bad for the \principals" who hire them. These \agency costs"
are frictions or losses which can be blamed on the fact that contracts and trust
are not suÆcient to completely eliminate conicts between contracting parties with
dierent interests.
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Here we give a brief sketch of how this \agency problem" could lead to escalation.
Suppose agents are of two types, smart and dumb. Smart agents choose better
projects (with higher benets and lower costs, statistically speaking) than dumb
agents do. Suppose that after a project is fully completed, the principals (e.g. a
supervisor or board of trustees) can observe the project's total costs and benets,
which gives them a clue { but an imperfect one { about whether the agent who
chose the project was smart or dumb. Now consider the incentives of agents who,
part of the way through the project, come to learn that the project is bad (so
E(MC) > E(MB)). Should they continue investing? Under many conditions
(though not all), the answer is \Yes". If they abandon the project that is a clear
probabilistic sign that the project was a bad one, and hence, that the agent was
dumb. Agents may prefer to continue investing and take their chances of being
red, later, when the total costs and benets are observed by their supervisors.
Applying the agency problem to the NBA, one could argue that coaches and general
managers (who are usually primarily responsible for draft decisions) play earlier
drafted players more minutes to validate their choices in the draft and not reveal
any mistakes. However, as we argue above, NBA organizations tend to have small
front oÆces where there is much interaction between owners, management, and
coaches. An agency problem is therefore less likely to arise in this situation since
owners are often actively involved in draft choices and subsequent team operations.
Staw (1996) comments, \My own view is that rational models such as agency
theory have simply translated social and psychological concepts into cost-benet
analyses, providing few advantages in making a priori predictions about escalation"
(p 195). We agree up to Staw's comma, and disagree after that. It is true that
many behaviors which have been well-documented in early organizational studies
and given psychological interpretations can be \rationalized" as the outcomes of
signaling games in which principals lack information that agents have, and agents
have conicting incentives about how to act on their information. Gibbons (in
19
Another possibility, which is rarely mentioned in the agency theory literature, is that principals are
making mistakes by not choosing better-designed contracts, by trusting untrustworthy agents, etc.
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press) summarizes some of these ideas and argues cogently for their place in orga-
nizational research.
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However, we disagree with Staw's conclusion that these models provide few predic-
tive advantages. In most cases, the theories provide clear conditions under which
agency problems will not occur. For example, escalation is less likely to occur as
principals know more about the ability of agents or as agents have less career incen-
tive to protect their reputations. Thus, agents who are older, or who are managing
partners in partnerships or have job tenure are probably less likely to escalate than
others.
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Zweibel's (1995) theory predicts that agents who have either very bad
or very good reputations are more likely to take socially-risky projects (e.g., de-
escalate when middle-reputation agents are escalating). Also, the agency theory
view predicts less escalation in owner-managed rms, where the agency problem is
small or nonexistent.
3. Overcondence. In many examples of escalation, it seems likely that agents simply
overestimate MB and underestimate MC, relative to estimates given by outsiders
looking at the same situation. This distinction is important because, in principle,
perceptions ofMC andMB might be measured separately and related to escalation
behavior. Digging deeper, these estimation biases might be caused by cognitive
dissonance, self-justication, or other forces. In the case of the NBA, coaches might
make overly optimistic predictions about a player's prospects and then update these
beliefs too slowly. Furthermore, these biases could also cause deescalation{ that
is, if one person has refused to invest in a project, they may escalate their refusal
to do so even when new information raises estimates of MB or lowers estimates of
MC and makes investment optimal.
4. Mutually-destructive escalation of unfairness. The \all-pay" dollar auction (Teger,
1980) is often taken as a prototypical example of organizational escalation. In
these auctions, players compete for a xed prize, say a dollar, by bidding. The high
bidder gets the prize but all bidders pay their bids. Bids begin at zero and can only
be raised in small increments. A typical pattern is that bids start out timidly, and
quickly escalate. Bidders often pause when bids get around a dollar, as they realize
that they will end up paying more than a dollar if they continue. But players think
that if they just bid a little more, the marginal cost is small (since the previous bid
is already sunk) and the marginal benet is a dollar. Winning bids often end up
many times larger than a dollar. This example is instructive because it includes
both escalation and a social or game-theoretic component. Part of the reason for
escalation seems to be that players become angry at one another because when one
20
For example, several theoretical papers show how agents who are averse to revealing their skills
will rationally \herd" and do what other agents do, even if the herd is likely to be acting ineÆciently
(Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Zweibel, 1995). Prendergast (1993) shows how promotion processes which
rely on supervisors rating their underlings creates economic incentives for the underlings to act in \yes-
man" ways that please supervisors.
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For example, this idea predicts that lawyers settle cases more quickly if they are partners than if
they are associates, and settle more quickly in small rms with fewer promotion rungs than in large
rms.
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person raises his or her bid, it harms others (by reducing their chance to get the
dollar). The only way for a harmed bidder to inict harm back is to raise his or
her bid in turn.
In this example it seems reasonable to conclude that players are thinking about
not just MC and MB, but about the social utility which arises from harming or
helping others who have harmed or helped you. If one properly models the utility
which arises from bidding, it may turn out that escalation is utility-maximizing
even if it costs bidders money. An initial, productive attempt to include these
forces into an extension of standard game theory has been made by Rabin (1993).
In Rabin's model, a player A imagines that the other player knows her likely action,
and then forms a judgment about whether the other player's response to A's action
is \nice" (gives A a large economic payo) or \mean" (gives A a low payo). Rabin
assumes that people get utility from economic payos and from the product of their
own fairness and the other player's fairness. Thus, if the other player is nice to A
(positive fairness), A maximizes utility by being nice as well. But if the other player
is mean to A (negative fairness) then A prefers to be mean as well. We conjecture
that mutually-destructive escalation in the dollar auction is a negative \fairness
equilibrium" in a formal sense that Rabin makes clear.
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5 Conclusion
There are two methodological messages implicit in how we approach the topic of es-
calation. The rst is that carefully dissecting a phenomenon to understand its basic
causes, and posing sharp questions about whether one cause or another can account for
the phenomenon, is a useful way to do research. The escalation literature seems to have
sometimes gone in the opposite direction, compiling long lists of various forces and con-
sidered escalation to be multiply determined{ which it surely is{ without trying to gure
out which eects are more important or distill the long list into a short one.
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Our argument is simply that mutually-destructive escalation in dollar auctions is distinctly dierent
from other types of escalation because it involves more than one party. If players get utility from how
others treat them and how they treat others, then escalation could be expensive but utility-maximizing
in a way that is not possible in single-player decision problems. Furthermore, this conjecture suggests
at least two types of interesting experiments which have not been done: (i) Conduct a single-player
version of the dollar auction in which players bid against a nonhuman bidder who is programmed to
stop at some unknown point. Unless people get social utility from how a program treats them (and vice
versa), we expect to see much less escalation in this setting than when bidding against other people. (ii)
Conduct a standard dollar auction, but halt the bidding at some previously-unannounced point, and
give the high bidder a chance to \deescalate" the process by lowering his or her bid to just below the
next-highest bid. If he or she does so, then the next bidder (who will now have become the high bidder)
can deescalate, and so forth. While lowering one's bid is not money-maximizing for the ranking high
bidder (it lowers costs, but means surrendering the dollar), in Rabin's terms this action is \nice" and
could trigger a nice reciprocation by the next bidder, and so on. This also allows the possibility that
players escalate niceness rather than simply escalating meanness (in the standard auction). Note that an
upward escalation of bids, followed by a downward deescalation, would both be evidence of escalation{
just in socially-opposite directions.
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The second methodological message is that establishing an irrational behavior using
eld data is econometrically tricky. When an eect appears to exist, one can acknowledge
alternative explanations and try to dismiss them with argument, anecdotal evidence,
or reason. Or one can include control variables and see if the apparent eect then
disappears. If the eect holds up, as the escalation eect in NBA playing time did, it
becomes deserving of even more serious attention.
More generally, psychological and economic methods are productive complements,
not substitutes. Economics ignores many aspects of behavior (details of thinking, so-
cial inuences, limited rationality) in order to concentrate on two things: (i) simple
formal assumptions about behavior (e.g. utility maximization) and (ii) predictions
about naturally-occurring data. As a result, economic reasoning is excellent for checking
whether behavior is rational and for drawing solid inferences from eld data and testing
alternative explanations tenaciously. We have argued that both of these features of the
economic method could be brought more directly to bear on escalation. At the same
time, psychological constructs and methods (particularly experiments) are useful for es-
tablishing sources of irrationality, which can then be plugged into economic theory with
an eye to prediction of naturally occurring patterns. Thus, good work of one sort raises
the marginal value of good work of the other sort.
5.1 Suggestions for further research
One way to demonstrate a rm grip on the phenomenon of escalation is to ask about
the conditions under which its opposite, deescalation, occurs (see Heath, 1995) { that is,
when do rms quit too soon? Asking this question could be a diagnostic tool to evaluate
underlying explanations. For example, if escalation is due to gambling in the domain
of losses, then one should see rms deescalating in the domain of gains.
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Similarly,
where escalation is due to mutually-destructive rivalry, we might also see deescalation
due to mutually-benecial cooperativeness. And if escalation is due to agency problems
which make managers reluctant to pull the plug on losing projects, do those same agency
problems lead to the failure to start promising projects in the rst place? Surely this is
the case.
It might be useful to look at instructive exceptions of rms or situations in which
escalation is often avoided. For example, consumer products companies introduce many
new products each year; and pharmaceutical companies work on hundreds of possible
products (e.g., drugs), mostly with negative initial feedback. How do these organizations
manage to avoid escalating?
Other naturally-occurring organizational examples do t the recipe for escalation and
could be studied in further research. For example, rich horse owners buy high-price
23
Data from individuals buying and selling stocks, for example, show that \losing" stocks are held
substantially longer before selling them than \winning" stocks which are `cashed in' more quickly. See
Weber and Camerer (in press) and Odean (1997).
20
(unraced) yearlings at age one. These horses debut in \maiden special weight" races and
often perform poorly. Horses that cannot win special weight races are usually dropped
to \claiming races" in which every horse can be purchased for a prespecied price. An
owner who spent a large sum for a yearling ($500,000 and up are not unusual) may be
reluctant to drop the yearling into the claiming category since the owner can prevent an
irreversible loss by keeping the horse in the special weight races category. (Running in
a claiming race risks \losing" the sunk cost.) The charm of this example is that betting
odds established by the public give an objective measure of the horse's true ability in
each type of race, which can be compared with the owner's (possibly biased) assessment.
A clear escalation bias is revealed if the betting odds for high-priced yearlings in special
weight races are higher than for low-priced yearlings.
24
We think our study illustrates two points: First, establishing systematic mistakes
using naturally-occurring data is very diÆcult. Of course, this does not mean we should
avoid such hard work and exploit the superior control of the lab; it just means that the
standard of proof for mistakes outside the lab is high, and should be. It is also likely
that important eld anomalies will not be established by a single study, but by a series of
studies which build on earlier results.
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Behavioral economists have learned that the best
way to win an argument about the existence of systematic mistakes is to take complicated
rationalizations oered by critics seriously (no matter how cockamamie they are), and
collect more data to test them. Our results on escalation in the NBA are an example of
how an interesting result can be established more rmly when alternative explanations
are properly accounted for.
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Another example is contracts for new musical acts (bands). Most bands are signed to provide several
records in several years and given a large nancial advance. The record company has the right to refuse a
record and drop the band. One can study whether record companies escalate their commitments to bands
who they signed for the largest advances. (This example is similar to the NBA draft because establishing
escalation clearly requires an outside measure of the record company's pre-signing expectations of how
well the band will do.)
25
Importantly, if journals are not receptive to publishing studies which build on earlier results, cumu-
lating knowledge, then knowledge will not cumulate as swiftly as it could.
21
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